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1997]

et al.:
Miriam
Osborn Memorial Home Assoc. v. Chassin
DUE
PROCESS

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Assoc. v. Chassin 2O8
(printed August 30, 1996)

The plaintiff, Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Association,
sought judicial declaration that assessments on the gross receipts
of health care facilities made under New York Public Health Law
section 2807-d 20 9 were unconstitutional, that the assessment
constituted a tax, that it was not liable for assessments imposed
by the law and also sought to enjoin enforcement of the
statute. 2 10 The plaintiff claimed that the statute violated its
substantive due process rights, denied it equal protection of the
laws and constituted a taking without just compensation. 2 1 1 The

208. N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
209. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-d (McKinney 1993). This section
provides in pertinent part:
1. (a) Hospitals... are charged assessments on their gross
receipts... on a cash basis in the percentage amounts and for the
periods specified in subdivision two of this section. 2.(b)(i) For
residential health care facilities the assessment shall be six-tenths of one
percent of each residential health care facility's gross receipts received
from all patient care services and other operating income. . . . 2.(b)(ii)

For residential health care facilities an additional assessment shall be
one and two-tenths percent of each residential health care facility's gross
receipts received from all patient care services and other operating
income ....
7. (a) Every hospital shall submit reports on a cash basis
of actual gross receipts received from all patient care services and
operating income for each month ... . 7. (b) Every hospital shall
submit a certified annual report on a cash basis of gross receipts
received in such calendar year from all patient care services and
operating income.
Id.

210. Mirimn, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
211. Id. In addition to the constitutional issues, plaintiff claimed the statute
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and unlawfully imposed a franchise tax upon it. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
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defendants entered two counterclaims seeking compliance with
the reporting requirements of the statute and payment of the
assessment imposed by § 2807-d. 2 12 The defendants moved for a
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and partial summary
judgment on their own counterclaims. 2 13 In response, the

plaintiff entered a cross motion for summary judgment on its
claims and for dismissal of defendants' counterclaims. 2 14 The
Appellate Division, Second Department, found that the statute
was not so arbitrarily designed or enforced as to offend either the
Due Process Clauses or the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Federal 2 15 or New York State Constitution, 2 16 nor did it

constitute an unjustified taking under either Constitution. 2 17 The
Every

person

who,

under

color

of any

statute,

ordinance,

regulation. . . of any State. . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id. N.Y. TAX LAw § 209 (1) (McKinney 1993). This section provides in
pertinent part: "For the privilege of exercising its corporate
franchise . . . every domestic or foreign corporation
franchise tax . . . ." Id.

212.
213.
214.
215.

. . .

shall annually pay a

Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "No person shall ...

be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment, section one,
provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . .deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
216. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article one, section six, pfovides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." Id.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). Article one, section seven, provides: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article one, section eleven provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof." Id.
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court granted defendants' summary judgment motion, dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint. 2 18 It further granted partial summary
judgment on defendants' counterclaims, directing compliance
with the reporting requirements of the statute, and denied
2 19
plaintiff's cross motion in its entirety.

Another plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation,

owns and

220

operates the Osborn Retirement Community.
The nursing
home is licensed by New York State under Article 28 of the
Public Health Law. 2 2 1 Pursuant to section 2807-d of the Public
Health Law, plaintiff was required to submit certified monthly

and annual income reports to defendants, the New York State
Department of Public Health and its Commissioner,

Chassin. 222

Mark

Defendants, in turn, were authorized under the

statute to receive and distribute the assessments. 2 2 3 Additionally,
the Commissioner was authorized to recoup deficiencies in

payments owed by a facility from third party reimbursers, such
as Blue Cross and Health Maintenance Organizations. 2 2 4

217. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27. The court, in turn, rejected
plaintiffs § 1983 claim on the grounds that a deprivation of federal rights was
not shown to have occurred under color of state law. Id. Plaintiffs contention
that it was exempt from §209 of the Tax Law was accepted by the court.
which further noted that the plaintiff remained liable for taxes other than a
franchise tax, such as the income assessment at issue in this case. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2800 (McKinney 1993). Section 2800
provides in pertinent part: "In order to provide for the protection and
promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state... the department of
health shall have the central, comprehensive responsibility for the development
and administration of the state's policy with respect to hospital and related
services...." Id. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801 (McKinney 1993).
Section 2801 provides the following definition: "Hospital means a facility or
institution engaged principally in providing services by or under the
supervision of a physician ... for the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of
human disease... including... [a] nursing home." Id.
222. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-d (4) (McKinneyl993).
223. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-d (6) (McKinneyl993).
224. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
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On becoming effective on January 1, 1991, the statute provided
for a .6 percent assessment on a hospital's gross receipts. The
statute provided an exception, only in the case of hospitals
experiencing financial hardship due to costs associated with bad
debts or the costs of providing charity care. 225 The statute was
amended the following year to include an additional 1.2 percent
assessment. 226 At that time, exceptions were also created for
voluntary, non-profit hospitals, totally dependent on charitable
contributions, and for hospitals limited to caring only for police,
firefighters, and emergency service workers.227
Initially, the court examined plaintiffs contention that the
arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the statute violated its
due process rights. 228 New York endorses the federal courts'
interpretation of the Due Process Clause which holds that
legislation, which is reasonably related to accomplishing a
permissible governmental objective, satisfies the substantive due
process requirements. 229 Plaintiff insisted that the governmental
purpose, as demonstrated by the legislative history, was to
procure savings in the Medicaid program. 230 This purpose,
plaintiff contended, was not furthered by enforcing the statute
against non-Medicaid providers like itself.23 1 The court,
however, disagreed with plaintiff's interpretation of the
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2807-d (1)(b) (McKinney 1993).
Section 2807-d (1)(b) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he following categories of hospitals shall not be charged assessments

pursuant to this section: (i) voluntary nonprofit and private proprietary
general hospitals which qualify for distributions made in accordance
with paragraph (c) of subdivision nineteen of section twenty eight
hundred seven-c of this article; (ii) voluntary nonprofit hospitals totally
financed by charitable contributions or by the income thereon dedicated
to the free care of low income patients; and (iii) any facility dedicated
solely to the care of police, firefighters, volunteer firefighters, and
emergency service personnel.
Id.
228. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.

229. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974).
230. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
231. Id.
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legislative history. 2 32 The court noted that the statute applied to
all "hospitals" licensed under Article 28, and not just those which
participated in the Medicaid program. 233 Instead, the court
agreed with defendants' position that the reduction of the state
budget deficit was the primary objective of the Legislature in
234
enacting the statute.
Further, plaintiff's contention that the statute was not intended
to apply to it, because there was no explicit method of
enforcement against non-Medicaid hospitals, was similarly
rejected. 2 35 Although the Commissioner of the Department of
Health was empowered to command third pares to withhold
payments from delinquent institutions and to pay such
deficiencies to the Department, the statute did not limit the
Commissioner to this method of collection. 23 6 Plaintiffs reliance
on prior decisions which excluded methods of enforcement not
mentioned in the statute in question 237 was rejected on the
grounds that those statutes provided comprehensive enforcement
provisions. 2 38 In this case, the court noted that there was no
similar elaborate enforcement scheme provided by the statute. 23 9
Additionally, legislation enacted under the Legislature's power
to raise revenue is violative of the Due Process Clause only when
it constitutes the arbitrary exercise of a power otherwise

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

237. Transamerica Mtge. Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. I1 (1981)(holding
that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in providing contractual remedies

for breaches of fiduciary duties, precluded a private right of action for
damages); N.A. Orlando Constr. Corp. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 129

Misc. 2d 1077, 1079, 495 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985)
(finding that an excavator was not a member of the class protected by the
statutory scheme which required a utility to furnish the location of its
underground facilities), aft'd, 131 A.D.2d 827, 517 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't

1987).
238. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.

239. Id.
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forbidden. 240 The authority of the Legislature to implement a tax
scheme is nearly unrestricted, being subject to constraint only
when the design is absolutely unreasonable. 24 1 As the tax scheme
in Miriam was reasonably related to the legislative purpose of

reducing the state budget deficit, and furthered that objective, the
court found no violation of the Federal or State Due Process
Clauses .242
Secondly, the court examined the plaintiff's contention that its

equal protection rights under both the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution and the New York State Constitution were
violated by the exemption of similarly situated facilities from the

statutory assessments.243 Equal rights challenges receive similar
treatment in New York and the federal courts. 244 Applying the
standard enunciated in Trump v. Chu, 245 the court found that the

statute must be upheld because its classification system was not
offensively discriminatory and was rationally related to a
the
Furthermore,
purpose. 246
governmental
legitimate
Legislature's latitude in devising a reasonable classification
247
scheme was recognized.
The issue in Trump concerned the validity of a real estate gains
tax on property transfers in excess of one million dollars. 248

Developers Donald Trump and Richard Pellicane argued that the
tax unfairly differentiated between transfers based on a monetary
240. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934); See also Ames
Volkswagen, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 47 N.Y.2d 345, 348-49, 391 N.E.2d
1302, 1304, 418 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (1979) (holding that a statute requiring
prepayment of estimated monthly sales tax liability was a proper exercise of
legislative authority).
241. Ames Volkswagen, 47 N.Y.2d at 349, 391 N.E.2d at 1304, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 326.
242. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
243. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
244. See Trump v. Chu, 65 N.Y.2d 20, 478 N.E.2d 971, 489 N.Y.S.2d
455, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 915 (1985).
245. Id.
246. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
247. Id. (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
359 (1973)).
248. Trump, 65 N.Y.2d at 22, 478 N.E.2d at 973, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
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amount, so that taxpayers whose gains were identical were taxed
differently on the basis of the final sale amount. 249 The Trump
court noted that a gross receipts tax which treated similar
transactions differently based on the total receipts of the business
had been invalidated by the Supreme Court. 250 However, the
Court's objection in that case was the failure to consider profit as
a factor in deciding whether to apply the tax. 25 1 In contrast, the
transfer tax in Trump was assessed only on the gain from the
property. 2 52 Thus, finding that the tax was only applied to
profits, and rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, the
253
court upheld the constitutionality of the tax scheme.
In Miriam, plaintiff did not challenge the rational relationship
of the exemptions to a legitimate state objective. 254 Additionally,
plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving the absence of any
rational basis for the imposition of the classification scheme
chosen by the Legislature. 255 The Second Department also
rejected plaintiff's contention that it was similarly situated to
25 6
institutions receiving exemptions under the 1992 amendment.
Plaintiff was not a charity hospital, nor did it care exclusively for
257
fire, police, and emergency workers.
Similarly, the court found the plaintiffs' argument that the
Department of Health was selectively enforcing the statute
without merit. 258 Recognizing that "latitude must be accorded
authorities charged with making the decisions related to
legitimate law enforcement interests, " 259 the court deferred to the
Department of Health's decision not to enforce the assessment
249. Id. at 24, 478 N.E.2d at 974, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
250. Id. at 25, 478 N.E.2d at 975, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (citing Stewart Dry
Goods v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, reh'gdenied, 295 U.S. 768 (1935)).
251. Trunmp, 65 N.Y.2d at 26, 478 N.E.2d at 976, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
255. Trump, 65 N.Y.2d at 25, 478 N.E.2d at 974, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
256. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 303 West 42nd Street Corp. v. Klein, 46 N.Y.2d 686, 694, 389
N.E.2d 815, 819, 416 N.Y.S.2d 219, 224 (1979).
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against three nursing homes suspected of having assessable
income during a period when they had no exemption. 260 Again,
the court observed, plaintiff had failed to show that enforcement
was impermissibly based on race, religion, or another arbitrary
standard.261
Lastly, the court examined the plaintiff's contention that the
statute violated the Takings Clause of both the Federal and State
Constitutions. 262 In the absence of a rigid rule for determining
when a statute results in an unconstitutional taking, both the
Federal and State courts consider several factors: the statute's
economic impact, its impact on investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the government action. 263 Once more,
plaintiff failed to meet its burden of production concerning the
adverse impact of the statute. 264 Additionally, the court
characterized the statutory scheme as an attempt to "adjust the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good," 265 a permissible government action which did not
constitute a compensable taking.266 Citing an early Supreme
Court decision, 2 67 the court observed its lack of power to alter a
tax scheme devised by the Legislature for the purpose of
redistributing its burdens.268
Having failed to demonstrate that any of its claims had merit,
plaintiff was not entitled to proceed to trial. 269 Thus, the court
granted summary judgment in defendants favor and dismissed the

260. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, reh'g
denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978); See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (upholding the imposition of penalties on
employers withdrawing from pension plans whose benefits are guaranteed by
the federal government).
264. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
265. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
266. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
267. Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1921).
268. Miriam, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 27.
269. Id.
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complaint. 2 70 Further, in granting partial summary judgment to
defendants on their counterclaims, the court directed plaintiff to
comply with the statute's reporting requirements. 27 1 Finally,
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on its claims and
272
for dismissal of defendants' counterclaims was denied.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
273
Moghimzadeh v. College of Saint Rose
(decided February 6, 1997)

Plaintiff, Mahmood Moghimzadeh, was terminated from his
employment as a tenured professor at defendant College of Saint
Rose, a private college, and alleged that he was deprived of his
Federal 274 and State275 constitutional guarantees of procedural
due process. 2 76 The Appellate Division, Third Department,
affirmed the order of the Supreme Court, Albany County which

dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of
action and held that the plaintiff did not have a valid due process
claim absent an indication that the defendant's action of dismissal
277
constituted "meaningful State participation."
The plaintiff argued that, although the defendant college is a
private entity, it is subject to regulation and inspection by the

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 653 N.Y.S.2d 198 (3d Dep't 1997).
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . .. " Id.

275. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section six provides in pertinent part: "[N]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " Id.
276. Moghimzadeh, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
277. Id. at 199.
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